The Scope of Collective Bargaining by unknown
THE SCOPE OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
PERHAPS no issues in labor relations have engendered more controversy in
recent years than those arising from the increasing attempts of employees to
influence decisions traditionally within the sole discretion of management. The
.controversy will undoubtedly be intensified by the decision of the Supreme
Court in Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 1 upholding a determina-
tion by the National Labor Relations Board 2 that an employer has a duty to
negotiate with the union about decisions to subcontract work even though the
decision was made for economic rather than anti-union reasons. The inclusion
of subcontracting in. the list of mandatory subjects of bargaining requires
employers to bargain to impasse with the union before unilaterally contracting
out work which could have been done by his own employees.
-The- Board's authority to define mandatory subjects of bargaining derives
from two provisions of the National Labor Relations Act: Section 8(a) (5),
which requires an employer to "bargain collectively with the representatives
of his employees .. .-3 and Section 8(d) which defines collective bargaining
as the mutual obligation of union and management to "confer in good faith
with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment . "' For many years following the passage of the NLRA the major
areas of dispute between labor and management fell clearly within the defini-
tion of Section 8(d), and the question of whether a particular subject matter
was within the scope of required bargaining arose with relative infrequency5
With the achievement of basic goals such as minimum wage standards, rea-
sonable hours, and satisfactory working conditions, however, union efforts have
naturally been directed to matters nearer the fringes of the statutory definition
of "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment ... ." To-
day, employees are likely to be as concerned with decisions about automation,
plant relocation, and contracting out work, all of which affect job security, as
they are with higher wages or better hours. Employers, on the other hand,
wish to retain the flexibility afforded them by unilateral control over such
traditionally "managerial" decisions.
Prior to recent Board decisions, management could, in general, refuse to
discuss with the union economically motivated decisions to contract out work.1
1. 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
2. 138 N.L.R.B. 550 (1962), enforced sub noum. East Bay Union of Machinists v.
NLRB, 322 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1963), aft'd, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
3. 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1958).
4. 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1958).
5. See Wellington & Summers, Labor Law: Cases and Materials (mimeograph ma-
terials on file with the Yale Law Library), p. 1-251 (Preliminary Ed., no. 2, 1964).
6. Ibid.
7. Hays Corp., 64 N.L.R.B. 406 (1945); Mahoning Mining Co., 61 N.L.R.B. 792 (1945).
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With the exception of a few aberrational cases,8 the Board found that an em-
ployer's unilateral decision to subcontract violated Section 8(a) (5) only when
the purpose was-to discourage union: membership or to completely avoid his
obligation to bargain with the union.9 Actually the finding of an 8(a) (5) vio-
lation was of secondary importance, since anti-union actions also violate Sec-
tions.8(a)-(-3) and 8(a) (1), which make it an unfair labor practice for an
employer to discourage union inembership or interfere with employees' rights
to engage in union activities. In the absence of anti-union motivation the
8(a) (5) charges against an employer were dismissed along with the 8(a) (1)
and 8(a) (3) complaints. 10 In such cases, the employer's only duty was to bar-
gain about the incidents or effects 1L of the decision upon his employees and
not about the decision itself.12 --
The major shift in Board policy regarding a nondiscriminatory, economically
motivated decision to subcontract work occurred in the Fibreboard case.
Shortly before the collective bargaining agreement was to e.xpire, Fibreboard
informed the union representing its maintenance employees of its decision to
subcontract out the work of its entire maintenance unit. 4 Fibreboard had
determined that substantial savings could be effected by such a subcontract.r5
Although the company had been -considering the feasibility of such a change
8. In Timken Roller Bearing Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 500, reversed on other gronds, 161
F.2d 949. (6th Cir. 1947), a complicated case involving several charges, the Board stated
that Timken had violated § 8(a) (5) by refusing to bargain about subcontracting. It is
unclear from the opinion, however, whether the violation arose from Timken's failure to
discuss the decision to subcontract or merely from its failure to negotiate about the inci-
dents or effects of that decision.
9. Cf. New England Web, Inc., 135 N.L.R.B. 1019, enforcement denied, 309 F.2d
696 (1st Cir. 1962); Rapid Bindery, Inc., 127 N..R.B. 212 (1960), enforced as modified,
293 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1961); W. L. Rives Co., 125 N.L.R.B. 772 (1959), enforcemcni
denied, 288 F.2d .511 (5th Cir. 1961) ;Industrial Fabricating, Inc., 119 N.LI.B. 162
(1957), enforced per curiam .sub nora, NLRB v. MacKneish, 272 F.2d 184 (6th Cir. 1959) ;
Houston Chronicle Publishing Co., 101 N.L.R.B. 1208 (1952), enforcement denied, 211
F2d 848 (5th Cir. 1954).
10. See Williams Motor Co. v. NLRB, 128 F.2d 960 (8th Cir. 1942), where an
employer was held to have violated § 8(a) (3) when he subcontracted the work of a de-
partment and discontinued- -its operation-for anti-union reasons.
11. -Brown Truck and Trailer AMfg. Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 999 (1953); Brov-wn-McLaren
Mfg. Co., 34 N.L.R.B. 984 (1941-). -
12. Although.the Board at times tended to blur this distinction, the courts of appeals
usually did not.- See, NLRB v. Adams Dairy, Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 815 (1962), enforced as
modified, 322 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1963h where the court reversed a determination by the
Board that a decision on the part of- Adams to terminate a phase of its business and
distribute all of its products through independent contractors was a mandatory subject
of bargaining. The court made it clear; however, that after the decision was made, § 8(a) (5)
did require negotiations concerning the treatment of employees who were terminated by
the decision: But see Timken Roller Bearing Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 500, reted on other grounds,
161 F.2d 949 -(6th Cir. 1947). -
13. 130 N.L.R.B. 1558 (1961), rev'd on reconsideration, 138 N.L.R.B. 550 (1962).
14. 379 U.S. 203,206 (1964).
15. Ibid.
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since 1954, the union had no previous knowledge of the plan.10 The company
stated that negotiation of a new contract, which the union had been seeking,
would be pointless.' 7 Four days later, the company terminated the employment
of the maintenance workers represented by the union and replaced them with
employees of Fluor Maintenance, Inc.18
The union filed unfair labor practice charges against the company, alleging
violations of Sections 8(a) (1), 8(a) (3) and 8(a) (5). In the first of its two
Fibreboard decisions, 19 the Board followed the previously established doctrine
by dismissing all of the union's complaints on the basis of the trial examiner's
finding that the company's motive in subcontracting out its maintenance work
was economic rather than discriminatory. The Board rejected the contention
that a management decision to cease one phase of its operations solely for eco-
nomic reasons was a mandatory subject of bargaining.20
But the first Fibreboard decision was shortlived. Thirteen months later,
after a change in national administrations and several changes in Board per-
sonnel, the NLRB again confronted the subcontracting problem and, in Town
and Country Mfg. Co.,21 reversed its first Fibreboard holding. In Town and
Country, the Board found that the company's decision to subcontract its haul-
ing operations was motivated by opposition to a newly selected union. The
Board added, however, that even if the company's action had been taken solely
because of economic considerations, the unilateral decision constituted an un-
lawful refusal to bargain.22 To the extent that Fibreboard held otherwise, that
case was overruled.23 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals enforced the Board's
Town and Country order, but only on the grounds that the company's deter-
mination to discharge its drivers and subcontract its work was based in part
on a desire to rid itself of the union.24 The court did not actually pass upon
the question of whether the employer would have been guilty of an unfair
17. Id. at 207.
18. Id. at 206. Fluor had assured Fibreboard that maintenance costs could be cut by
carefully planning the services to be performed, by reducing the work force and by
decreasing fringe benefits and overtime payments. Id. at 207.
19. 130 N.L.R.B. 1558 (1961).
20. The Board majority reasoned that, the case was not covered by the statutory
requirement that an employer bargain about matters affecting conditions of employment
since "[h]ere ... no employees remained in the unit to be represented by the Union, and
thus there necessarily could be no impact on the employment conditions of employees
remaining in the unit." Id. at 1561. The actual grounds of the decision are more probably
found in the Board's statement that the language of § 8(a) (5) is not ". . . so broad and
all-inclusive as to-warrant an inference that Congress intended to compel bargaining about
basic management decisions;.. ." Ibid.
21. 136 N.L.R.B. 1022 (1962), enforced, 316 F2d 846 (5th Cir. 1963).
22. Id. at 1026.
23. The Board stated that it was "now of the view that [the Fibreboard opinion]
unduly extends the area within which an employer may curtail or eliminate entirely job
opportunities for its employees without notice to them." Id. at 1027.
24. 316 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1963).
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labor practice if he had unilaterally subcontracted solely for economic rea-
sons.25
That question was squarely faced when the NLRB agreed to reconsider its
original decision in Fibreboard in light of its Town and Country opinion. In
its Supplemental Decision and Order,20 a majority of the Board held that
Fibreboard's failure to negotiate with the union concerning its decision to sub-
contract its maintenance work did in fact constitute a violation of Section
8(a) (5) .27 The Board ordered the company to reinstitute the maintenance
operation previously performed by the employees represented by the union,
to reinstate the employees to their former or substantially equivalent positions
(with back pay computed from the date of the Board's supplemental decision),
and to fulfill its statutory obligation to bargain.28
Following the D.C. Circuit's affirmance of the Board's orderp the Supreme
Court granted certiorari on the question of whether the subcontracting work
previously performed by employees in the bargaining unit is covered by the
phrase "terms and conditions of employment" within the meaning of Section
8(d). ° The Supreme Court affirmed the Board's decision, holding that the
subject of the dispute was well within the literal meaning of the statutory
phrase. According to the Court, inclusion of contracting out within the scope
of mandatory collective bargaining would effectuate the purposes of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act by "bringing a problem of vital concern to labor
and management within the framework established by Congress as most con-
ducive to industrial peace." 31
Sound considerations support the Court's finding of a duty to bargain in
this particular fact situation. 32 Essentially, the Fibreboard subcontract involved
no more than the replacement of one group of employees with those of a con-
tractor to do the same work in the same plant under the same ultimate con-
trol.3 Any advantages that Fibreboard might receive through such a subcon-
25. Unlike the Board. the Fifth Circuit thus merely reaffirmed the established rule
of finding a § 8(a) (5) violation only where anti-union motivation was present.
26. 138 N.L.RB. 550 (1962).
27. Member Rodgers dissented vigorously, stating that
If this ruling of the majority stands, it is difficult to foresee any economic action
which management will be free to take of its own volition and in its own vital
interest (whether it be the discontinuance of an unprofitable line, the closing of
an unnecessary facility, or the abandonment of an outmoded procedure) which
would not be the subject of mandafory bargaining.
Id. at 559-60. (Emphasis in original.)
28. Id. at 554-55.
29. Enforced sub nor. East Bay Union of Machinists v. NLRB, 322 F.2d 411 (D.C.
Cir. 1963).
30. 375 U.S. 963 (1964). The Court also granted certiorari on the question of whether
or not the Board had exceeded its power in requiring back pay. The Board's remedy
was upheld.
31. 379 U.S. 203, at 211.
32. See text at footnote 47, infra.
33. 379 U.S. 203, at 213.
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tract would be the result of economies achieved from a reduction of the work
force, decreased fringe benefits, or lower wages.84 The subcontract enabled
Fibreboard to avoid its statutory obligation to discuss such matters with the
representatives of his employees. An employee's right to have a voice in the
determination of wages and benefits is reduced to naught if the employer may
then unilaterally replace his workers with others who do the same work for
different compensation. The decision, furthermore, does not impose an undue
burden upon management.8 5 Fibreboard does not require that the employer
accede to union objections to his proposal to subcontract; the decision requires
only that he notify the union of his intention to subcontract and that lie dis-
cuss with them the questions of -wages, hours, and benefits - all traditional
subjects of collective bargaining - which are generally the crucial considera-
tions in subcontracting decisions. If the union is unable to offer a viable eco-
nomic alternative to subcontracting, the employer is then free to proceed with
his plan.
6
Although correct as applied to the facts, the rationale and the language of
the majority opinion are much too broad. While the grounds of the decision
are somewhat unclear, the Court appears to rest its holding upon the asser-
tion that the subject matter of the dispute fell within the literal meaning of
the phrase "terms and conditions of employment."37 Two arguments were
used to buttress this claim. First the Court noted that a stipulation in a col-
lective bargaining agreement regarding subcontracting might appropriately be
called a condition of employment.8 This bald statement, however, is a truism
that would apply with equal force to any 'stipulation which a party insisted
upon as a precondition to entering into an employment agreement. Greater
reliance was placed upon a second argument which may best be characterized
as an "impact" or "result" test: since the subcontract resulted in termination
of employment, the decision to subcontract clearly "affected conditions of em-
ployment." 9 Such a test implies that every management decision which either
results in terminations or has some other impact upon employees should be
subject to mandatory bargaining.40 Nearly all management decisions, however,
affect employees in some manner. Decisions involving sales programs, financ-
34. Id. at 206.
35. See, contra the dissenting view of Member Rodgers of the NLRB, note 27 supra.
36. 379 U.S. 203, at 214.
37. Id. at 210. In addition, the Court stated that its conclusion was "reinforced by
industrial practices." The evidence it cited, however, is not especially persuasive. The
Court referred to a study showing that 378 of 1687 collective bargaining agreements
analyzed "contained some form of limitation on subcontracting." Id. at 212 n.7.
38. Id. at 210.
39, The words ["conditions of employment"] even more plainly cover termination'of
employment which, as the facts of this case indicate, necessarily results from the
contracting out of work performed by members of the established bargaining unit.
Ibid.
40. Mr. Justice Stewart sees this implication in the majority's language and rejects
it. 379 U.S. 203, at 218.
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ing, and general efficiency of business operation ultimately may have as great
an impact on job security as seniority rights. A poorly run company will sup-
port fewer jobs than a well run company. Under the majority's impact theory
the collective bargaining process could subsume nearly all of the decisions that
now constitute the basis of entrepreneurial control.
The failure of the majority to offer a satisfactory cutting principle undoubt-
edly prompted the criticism by Mr. Justice Stewart, in a concurring opinion
joined in by Justices Harlan and Douglas, that the Court's opinion "radiated
... implications of disturbing breadth." 41 The three concurring justices em-
phatically rejected the idea that every management decision which terminates
an individual's employment is necessarily subject to mandatory bargaining.t
In their view, the purpose of Section 8(d) is to describe a limited area sub-
ject to the duty to bargain.4 3 The concurring justices would exclude from that
area those management decisions "which are fundamental to the basic direc-
tion of a corporate enterprise or which impinge only indirectly upon employ-
ment security... ."4 They concurred in the result on the narrow grounds
that Fibreboard was analytically similar to a case in which an employer avoided
his duty to bargain about wages by discharging his employees and replacing
them with others who were willing to work for less.45 The concurring opinion
- in contrast to the too sweeping majority opinion - rests upon an unduly
limited principle. For example, the concurring justices would exclude from
mandatory bargaining the replacement of employees by automation.4 And yet
the factors underlying a decision to automate and its amenability to manage-
ment-union discussion are strikingly similar to the subcontracting problem of
Fibreboard.
Somewhere between the Scylla of the majority's sweeping generalities and
the Charybdis of the concurrer's unduly restricted rationale lies a proper test.
Instead of considering merely the results of a decision, i.e., its potential im-
pact upon employees, the Board and the courts should seek to isolate and ex-
amine the factors which underlie a given decision. When considerations which
bear an intimate relation to employees (such as labor costs) are crucial to an
employer's decision, or when such considerations would be relevant to collec-
tive bargaining about a decision, a duty to bargain should be imposed. This
approach would compel management to negotiate not only with respect to the
type of subcontracting decision involved in Fibreboard, but would also require
41. Id. at 217.
42. Id. at 218.
43. Id. at 223.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
46. Justice Stewart stated that
an enterprise may decide to invest in labor-saving machinery. Another may re-
solve to liquidate its assets and go out of business. Nothing the Court holds today
should be understood as imposing a duty to bargain collectively regarding such
managerial decisions, which lie at the core of entrepreneurial control.
Id. at 223.
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negotiations with regard to such decisions as the replacement of labor by auto-
mation. In both cases, such considerations as wages, hours and work scheduling
are critical to the decision ultimately undertaken by the enterprise. On the
other hand, under a "relevancy" test, bargaining would not be compelled with
regard to such strictly managerial concerns as financing and sales promotion
since wages and hours are not usually central to these decisions.
The relevance test will not yield the same results for the same decision in
every case. For example, an employer's decisions to terminate portions of his
operation might be subject to mandatory bargaining in some situations, but
not in others. One possible case might involve a decision by a manufacturer
Df various products to cease production of a particular item because of a
drastic drop in demand for that product. Under the test proposed above, such
a decision would not be subject to mandatory bargaining since it was com-
pelled by considerations unrelated to labor issues. But when management de-
cides to close one of several departments or plants because of cost inefficiencies,
bargaining should be imposed since labor costs and related matters would be
crucial factors.47 Of course, in practice it may not be clear which factors under-
lie a particular decision. Consequently, bargaining should be required where it
is possible that labor costs or related matters are involved. If the decision is in
fact based upon external circumstances which could not be changed by union
proposals, impasse will quickly be reached.
Because the relevance test can distinguish between decisions which relate to
labor matters and those which do not, the test purposefully effectuates the
aims of the statute. Although the Act seeks to obtain for employees a voice in
the determination of matters that are ultimately related to their employment,
it does not provide for the submission to joint control of all the decisions ana
acts of an enterprise. 48 The approach outlined above seems best calculated
to distinguish meaningfully between those traditionally managerial decisions
which -should be excluded from mandatory bargaining and those which may
more appropriately be subjected to joint determination.
A finding that management's action is the kind of decision covered by Fibre-
47. In Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965) the
Supreme Court held that a single businessman could go out of business for any reason
including anti-union motivation - without violating either § 8(a) (1) or § 8(a) (3). The
Court also noted that no argument is made that § 8(a) (5) requires an employer to bargain
concerning a purely business decision to terminate his enterprise.
Id. at 267 n.5.
The Court went on to say, however, that a partial closing is an unfair labor practice
under § 8(a) (3) if motivated by an intention to discourage unionism, Id. at 275. The
Court did not pass upon the question of whether an employer is under a duty to bargain
about a partial closing which is motivated by economic considerations.
48. For decisions by courts of appeals excluding various management decisions from
the scope of the duty to bargain, see NLRB v. Adams Dairy, 322 F2d 553 (8th Cir,
1963) ; NLRB v. New England Web, Inc., 309 F.2d 696 (1st Cir. 1962) ; NLR3 v. Lassing,




board does not mean that management must negotiate about the decision in
all situations. Sometimes forcing negotiations will be extremely burdensome
to the company. This danger is especially accute in subcontracting cases be-
cause the need for subcontracting a particular operation will often be unfore-
seen at the time of the collective bargaining agreement. Requiring negotiations
in the middle of the contract period might be a great inconvenience. Also, a
large corporation may negotiate numerous subcontracts. The Westinghouse
Electric Corporation, for example, subcontracted more than 5,000 pieces of
work in a single year.49 Requiring negotiations here would be even more bur-
densome. The Board has recognized management's legitimate objections in
cases like these, and in a series of post-Fibreboard decisions 50 has indicated
that management might be excused from bargaining during the contract period
when the following factors existed:
(1) the collective bargaining agreement included either a "management
functions" clause, or a provision that could be construed as an indication
of the parties' intention to allow unilateral subcontracting by manage-
ment;
51
(2) the subcontracting involved comported with the traditional meth-
ods by which the employer conducted his business and did not vary in
degree or kind from subcontracting other work under the company's estab-
lished practice ;52
(3) the union had an opportunity to bargain about changes in exist-
49. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 150 N.L.R-B. No. 136, 58 L.R.R-M. 1257 (1965).
50. Shell Oil Co., 149 N.L.R.B. No. 22, 57 L.RtR.M. 1271 (1964); General Motors
Corp., 149 N.LLR.B. No. 40, 57 L.RR.PM. 1277 (1964); Kennecott Copper Corp., 148
N.L.R.B. No. 169, 57 L.R.R.M. 1217 (1964); Shell Oil Co., 149 N.L.R.B. No. 26, 57
L.R.R.M. 1279 (1964); Georgia-Pacific Corp., 150 N.L.R.B. No. 88, 58 L.R.R.M. 1135
(1965); Ador Corp., 150 N.L.T.B. No. 161, 58 L.RR.M. 1280 (1965); Vestinghouse
Electric Corp., 150 N.L.R.B. No. 136, 58 L.R.R.f. 1257 (1965); Superior Coach Corp.,
151 N.L.R.B. No. 24, 58 L.R.R.M. 1369 (1965); Fafnir Bearing Co., 151 N.LR.B. No.
40, 58 L.R.R.M. 1397 (1965) ; American Oil Co., 151 N.L.R.B. No. 45, 58 .IMR.M. 1412
(1965). But cf. Standard Handkerchief Co., 151 N.L.R.B. No. 2, 58 L.R.L 1339 (1965).
51. General Motors Corp., 57 L.PR... 1277, at 1278 (clause in national agreement
reserving to management the "exclusive responsibility" for actions and decisions con-
cerning the "methods and means" of operation); Shell Oil Co., 57 L.R.RLM. 1271, at
1273 (clause in collective bargaining agreement providing equal pay for employees to
whom work is subcontracted read as granting to management right to subcontract uni-
laterally) ; Kennecott Copper Corp., 57 L.thRMg6. 1217 (management rights clause); Ador
Corp., 58 L.R..M. 1280 (management rights clause giving employer exclusive right to
eliminate production of any of his products and to lay-off employees no longer needed).
See especially Fafnir Bearing Co., 58 L.RR.. 1397, where the Board states that the
trial examiner gave insufficient weight to the presence of a management functions clause.
Contrast the ever but slender regard the Supreme Court gave to a management rights
clause in an arbitration context in United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior and Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, at 583-89 (1960).
52. In Westinghouse Electric Corp., 58 L.R.LM 1257, 1258 the employer was found
not to have violated § 8(a) (5) by failing to consult the union about each of thousands
of annual subcontracting decisions involving bargaining unit work, since the company,
as the union knew, had engaged in such subcontracting practices since the early 1940's.
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ing subcontracting practices at the general negotiating sessions with the
company ;53
(4) the subcontract involved had no demonstrable adverse effect on
employees in the bargaining unit ;54
(5) the exigencies of the particular business decision involved required
unilateral action.55
Taken together, these factors establish a framework within which the Board
has reasonably restricted an employer's duty to bargain about subcontracts let
during the term of a collective bargaining agreement. It is not necessary that
all of these factors be present in a given case. On the other hand, neither is
any one factor dispositive. What is necessary (for an employer to be excused
from bargaining about a particular decision) is a showing that the union had
sufficient notice of the company's subcontracting plans and practices so that
the union could have raised objections during the preceding contract negotia-
tions.56 If the labor-management contract contains a "management rights"
clause, for example, the union may be deemed to have waived any objection
it might have to subcontracts let during the term of the agreement. This
waiver is effective at least when the subcontracts do not have a harsh and un-
expected impact upon employees in the bargaining unit. Even when the collec-
tive bargaining agreement contains no clause which either directly or indirectly
grants unilateral subcontracting power to management, the company will still
be free to continue established subcontracting practices. Here the workers are
put on constructive notice of the company's operation. Certainly the union
could have requested to bargain about subcontracting policy during the con-
tract negotiations. The basic concept underlying these decisions seems to be
that when the union has been given notice of the employer's subcontracting
practice, a unilateral subcontract will not disadvantage the union inordinately
- at least in comparison with the hardship that would beset management if
bargaining to impasse were required for each separate decision.
The Board's post-Fibreboard cases heed management's cry of inconvenience.
But they do not take from the union what it gained in Fibreboard. Under
Fibreboard, the union must be notified in advance of a proposed subcontract.
53. This assumes that the subcontracting practices were established policy of the
company so that the union was on notice as to their existence at the time of negotiation
of the collective bargaining agreement. Ibid.
54. Kennecott Copper Corp., 57 L.R.R.M. 1217; Shell Oil Co., 57 L.R.R.M. 1279. In
Superior Coach Corp., 58 L.R.R.M. 1369, and Fafnir Bearing Co., 58 L.R.R,M. 1397, the
Board indicated that the fact that no lay-offs, terminations, or reduction in working hours
occur as a result of the subcontract will be taken as evidence that the action was not
of significant detriment to the employees in the unit.
55. In Shell Oil Co., the Board stated that
[T]he amount of time and discussion required to satisfy the statutory obligation
"to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith" may vary with the character
of the subcontracting, the impact on employees, and the exigencies of the particular
business situation involved.
57 L.R.R.M. 1279, at 1280.
56. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 57 L.R.R.M. 1257, at 1258.
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Previously, a union's bargaining position was frequently undermined by the
fact that a subcontracting decision was presented to it as a fait aconipli. When
the subcontracting occurred in a context of surprise the union was prevented
from negotiating effectively for alternative solutions."7 It is possible that in
some instances the union will be able to convince the employer that it would
be more economcial to keep the work within the plant. 8 When management
has carefully studied the problem and has found that substantial savings can
be achieved through subcontracting, however, it is doubtful that the union can
make a better offer. Even in this situation the union may still use its bargain-
ing position to seek a more favorable termination settlement. For e-xample, a
union might be willing to agree to a subcontracting proposal that would ter-
minate bargaining unit work in exchange for a promise that terminated mem-
bers would be given preferential hiring rights in other areas of the employer's
operations. Fibreboard also makes it easier for a union to prove an 8(a) (1)
or 8(a) (3) charge. Although an employer was previously prohibited from
subcontracting -for anti-union reasons, 9 the charge was often difficult to
prove.60 Now, in discussing his decision to subcontract, the employer will be
required to present evidence showing the economic reasons for the change.0 1
The requirement of prior bargaining will clarify the actual bases of the de-
cision. When an employer is unable to present evidence of economic benefit,
the union will have a stronger case. Thus the Board's post-Fibreboard cases
accommodate both the union's interest in bargaining and the employer's inter-
est in flexibility.
57. See Standard Handkerchief Co., 151 N.L.R.B. No. 2, 58 L.PR.M. 1339 (1965);
Shell Oil Co., 149 N.L.R.B. No. 22, 57 L.RR.M. 1271 (1964).
58. The Fibrebbard majority thought it possible that the union could propose a mutu-
ally acceptable plan in that case. 379 U.S. 203, at 214.
59. See text at note 9 supra.
60. The courts have frequently overturned Board findings of anti-union motivation
in duty to bargain cases. See, e.g., NLRB v. Houston Chronicle Publishing Co., 211 F.2d
848 (5th Cir. 1954), denying enforcement of, 101 N.L.R.B. 1208 (1952); NLRB v. AV. L
Rives Co, 288 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1961), denying en!orcetent of, 125 N.LR.B. 772 (1959);
NLRB v. New England Web, Inc., 309 F.2d 696 (1st Cir. 1962).
61. See, e.g., NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956), in which the Supreme
Court held that an employer who refused to substantiate a claim of economic inability to
raise wages had not fulfilled his obligation to bargain in good faith.
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